

TENTATIVE OUTLINE FOR FINAL REPORT

The following outline sketches the content of a comprehensive final Survey Group report which could be classified "secret" and submitted to the National Security Council by 1 January 1949. It will probably be necessary to submit additional special reports at the conclusion of the Survey dealing with personalities or with particularly delicate matters. It may also be necessary to prepare a brief summary report which would be available for Congressional Committees and, if necessary, released to the public.

The following sketches the contents of the various chapters of the proposed comprehensive report:

Preface: Terms of Reference of the Survey Group.

(1) A statement of the terms of reference included in the two memoranda from Mr. Souers, the first one providing for the the survey of CIA and the second one providing for a survey of the Departmental Agencies.

(2) A brief discussion of how these terms of reference have been interpreted: the purpose has been to make a comprehensive examination of our structure for national intelligence as it has been created by the National Security Act and as it has developed in the individual Departments. This has involved a detailed examination of CIA, which

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was created as the coordinating agency for intelligence, and an

examination of the departmental intelligence agencies in order to *determine*

*their scope in the field of intelligence and*

*and* evaluate their relations to each other and to CIA.

(3) A brief statement of the procedure followed in submitting reports, including an explanation of the interim reports which have been submitted, and of the reasons for preparing one comprehensive report.

~~PART II~~ - Present Organization for National Intelligence →

Chapter I. The Background of Our Present Organization for Intelligence.

This chapter would provide an orientation in the problems which have led to the present intelligence structure and would seek to identify the principles which determined the set-up we now have. Reference would be made to the following points:

(1) The emphasis on intelligence as a result of our experience during the war, beginning with the alleged intelligence failure that contributed to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

(2) Our traditional neglect of intelligence in the Service

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(3) Our traditional neglect of espionage and other forms of clandestine operations.

(4) The wartime experience <sup>fortunate and otherwise</sup> with a "central intelligence agency", the Office of Strategic Services.

(5) The need to develop an intelligence organization more suited to our post-war responsibilities and power and the examination of this problem in conjunction with the reorganization of the Military Establishment.

(6) The principal studies made of this problem and the course of its handling: the Donovan proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Studies (JCS 1181 series), the Bureau of the Budget Report, the McCormack Report, the Lovett Board Report, the National Security Act of 1947.

(7) The historical development from OSS through SSU, State Department intelligence set-up, CIG, CIA.

(8) An analysis of the principal issues which were debated during the development of the present set-up and a statement of the principles which were finally decided upon.

(a) The reason why it was felt that a central agency was necessary (its functions of coordinating intelligence activities, coordinating intelligence estimates, ~~collecting intelligence~~, <sup>HAQ</sup> and providing certain central common services).

(b) The position of the central agency in the national structure (its relationship to the President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Intelligence Authority, National Security Council, Departmental Secretaries.

(c) The functions of the departmental intelligence services and their relations to the Central agency

## Chapter II. The Elements of a Sound Intelligence System

This chapter would attempt to analyze and develop standards for a national intelligence system against which we can measure what we now have and make recommendations for improvement. The following are some of the points which would have to be discussed:

(1) An analysis of the concept of a national intelligence system and of the position of a central intelligence organization. This would include an examination of the following problems.

- (a) The role of departmental intelligence *in wartime and peacetime, Washington and overseas.*
- (b) The need for coordination of intelligence activities
- (c) The need for coordination of intelligence opinion
- (d) The need for providing certain common central services, including the collection of secret intelligence.

(2) The structural relationship of a central intelligence agency to the policy-making agencies of the Government in order to determine who should control the central agency and how the need for independence in the central agency is to be reconciled, with the need to make its work relevant to operational requirements and of use to the policy makers. This will require an analysis of the concept "intelligence is a function of command".

(3) The question of personnel and leadership in intelligence, the proper balance between civilian and military participation and the need for trained professional personnel.

(4) The need for security and how this is to be met.

(5) The relationship of secret intelligence collection to the functions of coordination and whether these should be combined in the same organization.

- (6) The relation of secret intelligence to secret operations.

### Chapter III. Present Organization for National Intelligence.

This chapter would comprise a description of the legal and structural set-up which we now have. It would include the following:

- (1) An analysis of the position of CIA as defined in the National Security Act; the role of the Director of CIA in relation to the President and the Departments.

- (2) The intelligence responsibilities of the departmental agencies, including Army, Navy, Air, State, AEC, and JIC.

- (3) The responsibilities of the National Security Council for the coordination of intelligence.

- (4) The position of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

- (5) The U. S. Communications Intelligence Board.

- (6) An analysis of the principal existing directives, including the National Security Council Intelligence Directives.

## PART II - CIA

### Chapter IV. The Organization and Management of CIA

This chapter would include an overall sketch of the organization

*(and of its administrative operations:*  
set-up: The Directorate, Administration and Management, Inspection  
and Security, General Counsel. *Evaluation of CIA security,*  
*administration and personnel.*  
Chapter V. CIA's Responsibility for the Coordination of

### Intelligence Activities

This chapter would include a detailed examination of the organization and operations of ICAPS and of OCD <sup>and of O.R.F.</sup> (with reference to *its* <sup>their</sup> coordinating function) and an appraisal of CIA's achievements in coordinating intelligence activities.

### Chapter VI. CIA's Responsibilities for the Collection of

### Intelligence

This would involve an examination of OO and OSO and an appraisal of their accomplishments and of the adequacy of the present organization.

### Chapter VII. CIA's Responsibility for the Evaluation of

### Intelligence

This chapter would deal with ORE, its organization, activities and contributions to the intelligence picture.

### Chapter VIII. Special Operations

This would cover the existing work of the Special Procedures Branch in OSO and the proposed creation of an Office of Special Projects in accordance with NSC 10/2.

### Chapter IX. Conclusions with Respect to CIA

This would be a recapitulation of the principal points brought out in Chapters IV to VIII and an analysis of CIA's position in the intelligence structure in light of the criteria established in Chapter II. It would also include specific conclusions and recommendations.

## PART III - THE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

### Chapter X. The Department of State

An analysis of the organization, strength and position of the intelligence agency in the Department of State, including a definition of its fields of activity and an appraisal of its relationship to Department of State operations, to other Departments and to CIA. Normal State Department operations in relation to intelligence.

### Chapter XI. Department of the Army



Chapter XII. Department of the Navy

This would be a similiary analysis.

Chapter XIII. Department of the Air Force

This would be a similar analysis.

PART IV - OTHER AGENCIES

This part might include chapters on the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, inasmuch as our charge<sup>to</sup> does not specifically include these agencies, it would probably be better to refer to them in other appropriate chapters rather than devote individual chapters to each of them.

PART V - SELECTED PROBLEMS  
(For Example, the following)

Chapter XIV. Communications Intelligence.

This would be an attempt to appraise the importance of communications intelligence in relation to the other sources of intelligence under present circumstances and to examine whether there is effective dissemination of communications intelligence and whether it is being properly used in relation to other materials.

#### Chapter XV. National Intelligence Estimates.

This will be an examination of the concept of national intelligence estimates, the coordination of intelligence opinion and the way in which this problem is being handled at the present time, as between CIA under the National Security Council and the <sup>Joint Intelligence Committee</sup> ~~Joint Chiefs of Staff~~ under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

#### Chapter XVI. Counter Intelligence

This chapter would attempt to take a cross section through the various interested departments and agencies, including CIA, State, the Service departments, and the FBI, in order to appraise the effectiveness of activities and coordination in counter intelligence matters.

#### Chapter XVII. Scientific Intelligence.

There is no special agency ~~Scientific Intelligence~~ responsible for scientific intelligence matters, and there should probably be a special chapter on this subject which would attempt to divide the respective responsibilities of the various departments and of CIA and the means of concerting their efforts.

#### Chapter XVIII - Case Studies

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*Examples, where the experience, of how particular problems were handled, with respect to the collection, evaluation,*

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*dissemination and use of intelligence, e.g.*

PART VI - COOPERATION

*conclusions*

PART VII - RECOMMENDATIONS